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The current study examines individuals who were raised in a certain religion 
and at some stage of their life left it. Currently, they define their religious 
affiliation as ‘no religion’. A battery of explanatory variables (country-
specific ones, personal attributes and marriage variables) was employed to 
test for the determinants of this decision. It was found that the tendency of 
individuals to leave their religion is strongly correlated with the degree of 
strictness of their country and with their spouse's religious characteristics. 
Moreover, personal socio-demographic features seem to be less relevant. 
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1   Introduction 
The paper examines individuals who were raised in a religion and at some stage in life 
left their religion and currently define their religious affiliation as ‘no religion’.  
In order to identify the individuals who stepped out of any religious affiliation and to 
find out what are the factors that significantly affected this drastic move, a battery of 
diverse explanatory variables was employed and Hypotheses regarding the effects of 
these variables, based on sociological and economic theories, were formulated. The 
variables include: (i) country specific variables: pluralism index; existence of state-
religion and state-regulation of religion; national average level of mass attendance and 
of prayer; (ii) personal attributes that include: childhood and parental religious 
background; socio-economic and demographic personal determinants; and beliefs; and 
(iii) marriage effects: marital status and spouse’s religion (for married individuals).  
The data used for the empirical analysis were drawn from the module on National 
Identity of the 1998 International Social Survey Program (ISSP): Religion II. The ISSP 
is an ongoing effort devoted to cross-country research on national attitudes. It includes 
questions on attitudes, beliefs and opinions on various issues, as well as numerous 
questions regarding the individual’s socio-economic background, together with 
information on parents and spouses. Individuals were sampled within the following 
countries: Australia, Germany, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, The United States, 
Austria, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, The Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, New Zealand, Canada, The Philippines, 
Israel, Japan, Spain, Latvia, The Slovak Republic, France, Cyprus, Portugal, Chile, 
Denmark and Switzerland. Most of these countries are predominantly Christian 
(Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and other Christian faith); a small share of respondents 
grew up as Jews or as Moslems; and about 1.3% were raised in other religions (see 
Table 1 for details). The data covers the European and Australian continents and North 
America
2. The African continent is excluded and South America and Asia are 
represented by a small number of countries (Chile, Japan, Israel and the Philipines). The 
research is therefore pertaining to Europe, North-America and Australlia, and a few other 
                                                 
2 An interesting point relating to this is that historically, secularization finds its roots in the enlightenment 
movement of the 17
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th century in Europe and America, that were predominantly Christian. 
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countries. The more homogenous European sample is also analysed seperately and 
results of the larger sample are compared with the results for the European sample. 
The paper joins the growing body of literature on the phenomenon of secularization. 
There is a consensus that secularization, mainly in Europe and other Western countries, 
is well advanced (e.g. Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers, 2001; Bruce, 1992; Branas-Garza, 
2004; Branas-Garza and Neuman, 2004)
3. However, there is less agreement on what are 
the best indicators of secularization, or on the indicators of its counterpart, that is, 
religious adherence.  
The term secularization has been referred to and defined in various ways. Often, the 
term 'secularization' has been used to indicate a decrease in religious adherence and 
practice.  Religious adherence is difficult to measure. Church
4 statistics and national 
surveys provide data on active participation, especially attendance at religious services. 
Surveys also reveal the proportion of the population which believe in various statements 
of faith and creed. Branas-Garza and Neuman (2004, 2007) used both participation in 
church services and the private/intimate activity of prayer as indicators of religious 
adherence. Williams and Lawler (2001) developed the Religious Behaviours Scale. It 
was constructed based on ten items related to religious commitment and was then 
decomposed into two sub-scales: The Church Involvement Subscale and the Personal 
Faith Subscale. Voas (2003) used baptism of one's child as an indicator of affiliation. A 
limitation of this last indicator is that, obviously, it can only be used to study 
secularization within Christian denominations. 
 The above measures relate to aspects of active participation, official membership or 
agreement with basic religious doctrines. In contrast, in this study we treat religion and 
religiosity as an element of the individual's self-description of his personal religious 
identity. This is in tie with Barret et al. (2001) who suggest the following definitions: (i) 
nonreligious: persons professing no religion, no interest in religion; secularists; 
materialists; agnostics – but not militantly anti-religious or atheists; (ii) atheists: 
militantly anti-religious or anti-Christian agnostics, secularists or Marxists; and (iii) 
nonreligionists: a term encompassing the two varieties of unbelievers, (i) and (ii).  
                                                 
3  On the other hand, there is also a religous backlash movement on secular society. In three major 
religións (Christian, Moslem and Jewish) there are leaders and groups who are trying to reclaim the faith 
and bring back religious values and norms. Unfortunately, some of these groups are fundamentalist ones 
and also bring a message of intolerance and hate (Christiane Amanpour, in her Project on God’s Warriors, 
aired on CNN, August 22-24, 2007).  
4  The term 'church' is used as a generic term that refers to the relevant religious institution, that is a 
synagogue in the Jewish religion, a mosque in the Moslem religion etc.   4
Our definition of 'seculars' is close to the definition of 'nonreligionists' in Barret et al. 
(2001).  However, we refer to a sub-group of nonreligionists, by adding an additional 
condition of being raised in a religion. Respondents were categorized based on their 
responses to the following questions: “In which religion have you been raised?” and 
“What is your current religion?”. The two categories contrasted in this study are: 
individuals who were raised in a religion and now have ‘no religion’, versus individuals 
who were raised in a religion and also belong to a religion at the time of the survey
5. 
Secularization is therefore defined in this study as moving away from religion. We used 
the terms: ‘secularization’, ‘converting out’ and ‘disaffiliation’ for the move from 
religion to ‘no religion’, and the terms 'nonbelievers' or 'nonreligious' for the subjects 
who undertook this move. We use these terms inter-changeably throughout the paper. 
The paper is structered as follows: In the following section, hypotheses (propositions) 
are formulated based on the relevant literature. The next section describes the samples 
and  presents the regression results of 'converting-out' equations used to test the 
hypotheses and analyse the determinants of secularization. The last section offers 
concluding remarks and a discussion.  
 
2    Literature Overview and Propositions 
Several sets of variables have been introduced in order to identify and explore the 
determinants of secularization. The choice of variables was driven by the relevant 
literature (both the theoretical and empirical), by common sense speculation, and by 
constraints of data availability. 
(a) Country-specific variables: 
(a1) The country's religious strictness 
The first set of hypotheses relates to the interrelationship between secularization and the 
country's religious strictness. Three measures have been employed to represent religious 
strictness (or diversity) of the country. 
- The P index that represents religious pluralism (diversity) and is defined as P=1-HHI, 







                                                 
5  The current religion could be a different religion from the one raised in. Respondents who were raised 
with ‘no religion’ were excluded from the analysis.   5
the sum of squares of the shares of the country’s religious denominations
6. It follows 
that P ranges between 0 (if everyone belongs to the same religion) and (almost) 1 (if 
there are a large number of religions, each of which covers a negligible fraction of the 
population). The larger P is, the more religiously diverse the country is said to be (see 
also Liberson, 1969 and Voas et al., 2002 who refer to the same diversity/pluralism 
index). 
Two other measures of religious strictness are: 
- The existence of a state-religion  
- The existence of state-regulation of religion
7 
The latter two measures are associated with lack of religious freedom and demonstrate 
the state's religious monopolistic power
8. 
What is the relationship between religious pluralism (large value of P and non-existence 
of a state-religion and state-regulation) and secularization? The literature does not 
provide a clear-cut response to this question. Two competing theories will be presented: 
The ‘supply-side’ or ‘market’ theory that predicts less secularization (more religious 
adherence) in countries more religiously-diverse, i.e., a negative relationship between P 
and secularization and a positive effect of the existence of a state-religion and state-
regulation on secularization; and at the other end, the ‘demand-side’ theory or the 
‘secularization hypothesis’ that expects more  secularization in more religiously 
pluralistic states, i.e., a  positive relationship between P and secularization versus 
negative effects of state-religions and state-regulations
9.  
The supply-side approach focuses on the competition among religion providers, the 
claim is that religious markets function like other markets: A greater diversity of 
                                                 
6 The HHI is borrowed from the analysis of industries, where  i s  is the market share of firmi , in a given 
industry.  HHI serves as a measure of the competitiveness of an industry. In an industry with a single  
monopolistic producer, HHI will equal 1. If the industry is composed of n firms of equal size, then HHI = 
1/n , and as the number of firms is increasing HHI, is approaching 0.  
7 In contrast to a state-religion which either a country has or not, state-regulation is a measure which can 
differ extensively from one country to another and would be more accurate to measure using a scale. 
However, it is common to use a dummy variable of yes/no to represent it and we also follow this 
characterization. Barret at al. (2001) list the countries who have state-regulation of religion and we used 
their characterization. 
8 Barro and McCleary (2005) provide a comprehensive country-by-country study on the adoption and 
abandonment of state-religions over time. 
9 Earlier and much stronger interpretations of the secularization paradigm predicted that religions may 
cease to appeal to the masses with the advances of technologies, comunnication and democratization (see 
Wilson, 1966 and Martin, 1978, among others). We limit the interpretation of this paradigm to the 
relationship between religious pluralism and secularization.   6
religions available in a country is said to promote greater competition, and hence, a 
higher quality religion product. Religiously pluralistic markets would stimulate 
churches to produce religious services well adapted to the needs of religious consumers, 
thereby increasing ‘consumption’ (e.g. church attendance) (examples of such studies 
include Iannaccone, 1991, 1992, 1995; Fink and Stark 1988, 1992; Fink and 
Iannaccone,1993; and Stark and Iannaccone, 1994)
10. An often cited example for the 
positive relationship between pluralism and religiosity is the United States, which 
among the industrialized nations, has both the highest levels of religious pluralism and 
one of the highest rates of church attendance (e.g. Warner, 1993). Thus, more religious 
diversity stimulates greater religious participation (less secularization). 
The efficiency of religion providers is furthermore decreased if there is a state-religion 
and greater state-regulation of religion – measured, for instance, by whether the 
government appoints or approves church leaders (Chaves and Cann, 1992). Whereas in 
the United States having a state-religion is unconstitutional, Europe has a number of 
democratic countries which declare and maintain a monopoly state-religion (Lutherans 
like Denmark or Norway; Anglicans like England, etc.). The supply-side theory would 
expect more secularization in countries with state-religion and state-regulation of 
religion. An often cited example in this context is Sweden that had a state-religion (until 
the year 2000) and also exhibited high rates of secularization, mainly among young 
people who were born to religious parents, and switched to 'no religion' (Shy, 2007, 
page 1133). 
However, a state-religion and state-regulation of religion also typically involve 
subsidies, such as: payments to church employees, favourable tax schemes for the 
religion sector, building churches and religious institutions, subsidies to religious 
schools and curricula, and collection of taxes dedicated to church uses. Economic 
speculation suggests that these subsidies would encourage religious activity (more 
personnel and improved facilities attract more churchgoers) and create a positive effect 
on religious participation. The overall effect of state-religion and state-regulation on 
religious participation is therefore ambiguous. Barro and McCleary (2003), who used 
                                                 
10 This literature got some of its inspiration from Adam Smith (1791, Book V, Article III). State-religion 
plays a central role in Adam Smith’s vision of the religion market. According to Smith, the key aspect of 
state-religion is its promotion of the monopoly position of the favoured religion. Smith’s analysis focused 
on the adverse consequences from the monopoly positions of the Anglican Church in England and the 
Catholic Church in other countries, arguing that monopolistic providers of religious services tend - as 
monopolies generally do - to become non-innovative and indolent. Consequently, service quality and 
religious participation declined.   7
country averages of survey data from the 1980s and the 1990s, found that the presence 
of a state-religion raised religious participation. Their interpretation was that the 
subsidy element in state-religions dominated over the monopoly element leading to a 
combined effect of less secularization.  
At the other end, the literature presents demand-side theories
11 that claim the very 
opposite: more diversity leads to less participation (higher secularization). In countries 
with a diversity of religious denominations, individuals are exposed to a variety of 
religion products and this might weaken their ties with the religion they were raised in 
(e.g. Kelley, 1977; Sherkat, 1991). The process of disaffiliation is magnified by 
intermarriage. If there is a dominant denomination, a high proportion of marital unions 
will bring together two people with the same religious affiliation. On the other hand, in 
a multi religion country there are higher prospects of intermarriage. Intermarriage 
reduces the probability of religious affiliation for the offspring and increases the 
likelihood of disaffiliation for the spouses (Voas, 2003). 
The conflicting effects that religious diversity has on religious affiliation, leaves 
therefore, the question of the observed relationship between P  and secularization 
unanswered. Most probably, both supply and demand forces exist in society and both 
shape the relationship between P and secularization. The direction of relationship is 
determined by the more dominat force. A considerable amount of empirical work has 
explored this issue. Some of the empirical studies seem to support one side and some 
the other (see Chaves and Gorski, 2001, who presented a major review of 193 tests in 
26 published articles)
12. We will contribute to this empirical literature a careful 
statistical analysis that will unravel whether (in the examined countries) more diversity 
leads to an increase or a decrease in the tendency to leave religion, and whether 
disaffiliation is less or more common in countries that have state-religion and state-
regulation.  
The following propositions follow: 
                                                 
11 Demand – side theories are more poular in the sociological literature and are in line with the 
‘secularization hypothesis’. It first appeared in Weber (1930) who credited the idea to Wesley’s writings 
in the late 1700s. More recent discussions can be found in: Iannaccone (1991), Fink and Stark (1992) and 
Fink and Iannaccone (1993). 
12 Voas et al. (2002) claim that most of these studies suffer from various methodological and statistical 
problems and have to be revaluated.   8
Proposition 1: The relationship between the P Pluralism Index and secularization 
is ambiguous. It is negative if supply-side forces are dominant and positive if demand-
side effects dominate.  
Proposition 2: The effect that a monopoly state-religion has on secularization is 
ambiguous. However, as a state religion is associated with less diversity, the effects of 
religious pluralism and of a state-religion should have reverse signs. 
Proposition 3: The effect that state-regulation has on secularization is ambiguous. 
However, as state-regulation is associated with more strictness, the effects of religious 
pluralism and of state-regulation should have reverse signs. 
 (a2) Country religious adherence 
The second set of hypotheses relates to the religious adherence of the population in the 
country. Two variables were used to measure religious adherence: 
- The country average level of church attendance (on a scale of 1-to-6, ranging from not 
attending at all to attending at least once a week). The term 'church' is used as a generic 
term that relates to the relevant religious place of worship (e.g., also synagogue for 
Jews, mosque for Moslems etc.). The religious rules of congregation vary between 
religions (e.g., many orthodox Jews congregate once or even twice a day, while 
Christians congregate once a week). However, the six categories of the question related 
to church attendance have levels that minimize this problem. For instance, the upper 
category is 'at least once a week', and it covers the most observant respondents from all 
religions. 
- The country average level of private prayer (on a scale of 1-to-11, ranging from never 
to several times a day). Here too, prayer obligations vary between religions (e.g., Jews 
need to pray 3 times a day; Moslems 5 times a day), but the upper category of 'several 
times a day' encompasses the most observant respondents.  
Church attendance is a public activity, whereas prayer is a private/intimate religious 
activity that has pure religious motives.  
Country average church/mass attendance captures the ‘religious endowment’ of the 
country that might affect religious affiliation by increasing the benefits and reducing the 
cost. Benefits are increased via consumption and investment effects: churches serve as 
social networks where people can socialize (a consumption motive) and also build and 
boost professional and business ties and links (an investment motive). Churches that   9
enjoy more frequent participation therefore serve as more efficient and productive 
networks that could also yield higher rates of return on the investment element. Higher 
levels of church attendance create a social and economic incentive for affiliation with a 
church, thereby reducing the probability of secularization. Costs of participation are 
lower in countries with higher levels of participation that also have more churches and a 
larger religion-market. As a result, commuting costs are reduced, increasing the net 
benefits
13. Moreover, in a more religious country there are costs associated with being 
non-religious. Being different could affect social integration, labour force participation 
and more. 
Proposition 4 is therefore: A negative relationship between the country-level church 
attendance and secularization. 
Private prayer has no social or networking benefits, and therefore, can be employed to 
gauge the extent of one's relation to God and religion. In countries where prayer is more 
common, the individuals could be less prone to convert-out due to social influence and 
conformity (e.g., Torgler, 2006). 
Proposition 5 is therefore: A negative relationship between the country-level prayer 
and secularization. 
In sum, we conjecture that the national religious environment should affect individual 
decisions on religion choice
14. 
 
(b) Personal attributes: 
(b1) Exposure to religiosity during childhood 
It is now well established that an individual’s norms, tastes and beliefs are, to a large 
extent, determined during the formative young years. The experiences and impressions 
                                                 
13 Imagine, for instance, the case of Estonia (the most secular country within Europe) with only around 
25% of their habitants affiliated with any religion. In Estonia there are reduced benefits of social 
networking through the local church and because there are very few churches commuting costs are high. 
14 Another country-specific factor  regards the effect of having a religion different from the one prevalent 
in country of residence. This point could definitely relate to factors such as social and network effects. 
One could compare secularization percentages of Jews in Israel and Jews outside of Israel; and of 
Christians in predominantly Christian countries compared to Christians in countries which are not (Japan 
and Israel). This, however, cannot be done in the Moslem case, as predominantly Moslem counties are 
not included in the sample. Unfortunately our sample includes a very small number of Jewish respondents 
who live outside Israel and of Christian respondents who live in Israel. Sample size limitations therefore 
prevent the testing of the relationship between secularization and this country-specific element.   
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during childhood and adolescence have a lasting effect on behaviour, via two parallel 
processes: intergenerational transmission from parents to their offspring and also peer 
effects within the community the child grew up in (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, 
1981; Inglehart, 1990; Bisin and Verdier, 2000, 2001; Bisin et al, 2004). Sherkat and 
Wilson (1995) used the concept 'adaptive preferences' and claimed that socialization 
through childhood religious practice will create preferences upon which later religious 
choices will be made. It follows that more exposure to childhood religious socialization 
will decrease the likelihood of secularization later on in life. Two variables were used in 
our study in order to represent childhood religious socialization: ‘Both parents with the 
same religious denomination’ and ‘the respondent attended church services intensively 
when he was 12 years old’. 
- Both parents had the same religious affiliation: If the founding couple do not share the 
same religion, they are less likely to pass on a religious legacy, due to disagreement 
about religious rules. Intermarriage by itself, signals that religion has lost its value and 
importance. The result could then be that the children will abandon the religions of the 
two parents and identify their religious affiliation as ‘no religion’. Additionally, if the 
mother and father had different religious denominations, affiliation with the religion of 
one of the parents could lead to conflict with the other one. Choosing the 'no religious'   
option is symmetrical with the two parents and might avoid conflict. It therefore follows 
that, 
Proposition 6: The probability of secularization is lower if both parents had the 
same religious affiliation. 
- Exposure to church services during childhood: Church attendance during childhood is 
an indicator of religious upbringing and refers to the child's integration in a religious 
community. Shy (2007) who presented a dynamic theoretical model of religious 
conformity and conversion, claimed that religious education by parents and by the 
church enhanced religious conformity.  
The ISSP includes a question on participation in mass services at the age of 12 that 
includes 9 alternative levels
15. This question was used to define the   following dummy 
                                                 
15 The ISSP question is: "When you were 12 years old, how often did you attend mass services at the 
church?" The options are: Never (1); once a year (2); one or two times a year (3); a few times a year (4); 
once a month (5); two or three times a month (6), almost every week (7); every week (8); several times a 
week (9)   11
variable: intensive practice = 1, for original values of: 7 (attended almost every week), 
8 (every week), and 9 (several times a week). The next hypothesis follows: 
Proposition 7: There is a negative relationship between the intensity of church 
attendance during childhood and secularization later on in life; individuals who 
attended church services intensively have a lower tendency to be in the ‘no 
religion’ category when they grow up. 
(b2) Socio-demographic characteristics 
- Present age: Obviously, the more relevant variable is age of disaffiliation and not 
current age. Unfortunately, respondents were not asked when they converted out. 
Nevertheless, current age embodies cohort effects: Secularization was not common 
decades ago and advanced during recent years. Assuming that most individuals 
converted out at their 20s or 30s, because young people are more revolutionary, it 
follows that older people (e.g. above the age of 60) belong to a cohort when 
secularization was less common and therefore have a lower tendency to disaffiliate. 
Thereby leading to: 
Proposition 8: Secularization is less pronounced among older respondents. 
- Education: There is ambiguity regarding the effect of education on church attendance. 
There are two opposing channels that relate education with churchgoing: (1) the first 
points to a negative relation. It considers the observation that more educated people tend 
to be more rational. Effectiveness and efficiency, without much consideration for 
traditional and religious values, are emphasized (Berger, 1967). Moreover, education 
decreases belief in the returns of religious activity, thereby reducing the incentives to 
participate in these activities; (2) an opposing channel leads to a positive relationship 
between education and church attendance via a social networking effect: religious 
activity is a major form of social interaction (Durkheim,1995). Social group 
membership almost universally rises with education
16 and the church is simply another 
form of a social group. The benefits stem from networking effects that could even lead 
to improvements in the worshiper’s financial and professional prospects. The two 
conflicting effects could lead to a (combined) positive or negative correlation between 
education and churchgoing, or to an insignificant correlation.  
                                                 
16 Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001) report a positive connection between schooling and social group 
membership in almost all 69 countries that they examined.   12
In view of the above analysis, how is education expected to affect the movement to the 
‘no religion’ group? Individuals who choose to disaffiliate with their religion are most 
probably individualists who do not appreciate social/religious interactions. As the social 
benefits from affiliation are irrelevant for them it is expected that their tendency to leave 
religion will grow with education
17. Thus, 
Proposition 9: Secularization is positively affected by education.  
- Household income: Members of the lower economic strata (who are restricted from 
worldly opportunities) value the compensatory religious goods much more than 
members of the upper strata (Sherkat and Wilson, 1995). Montgomery (1996) 
constructed a dynamic model where non-conformity is generated by a mismatch 
between an individual's income and the level of strictness of his religious denomination. 
In his model, high-income individuals may leave their parents' denomination if it is too 
strict. This leads to 
Proposition 10: Respondents who enjoy high incomes (above the 75th percentile) 
have a higher tendency to disaffiliate. 
- Place of residence: People will take a more liberal point of view on religion the more 
contact they have with the modern rationalized world. Accordingly, people who live in 
rural areas are more traditional and less prone to ‘converting out’ of religion, compared 
to those who live in urban areas. People in urban areas have also more alternatives for 
using their time and more consumption and leisure options. In addition, in rural areas 
people live in communities, and as they are usually religiously oriented, converting-out 
might also alienate one from his community.  
Proposition 11: Living in rural areas decreases the probability of disaffiliation. 
(b3) Attitudes and beliefs 
The ISSP provides information on several aspects of attitudes, norms and beliefs. 
- Party affiliation that is associated with political attitudes, i.e., affiliation with parties 
that represent either the left-, center-, or right- wing of the political spectrum. The left-
                                                 
17 Sherkat (1991) offered two additional hypotheses that relate to education: i) educational mobility – 
individuals who have experienced intergenerational educational mobility will switch religious preferences 
at a higher rate; and ii) peer educational differences – individuals who differ substantially in educational 
attainment from their peers in their denomination of origin will have higher rates of religious switching. 
Our data base does not have the information needed to test these two hypotheses.   13
wing parties are usually the most liberal while the right-wing parties are usually the 
least liberal. Therefore 
Proposition 12: Party affiliation affects the tendency to convert-out, ranging from 
highest for individuals who are affiliated with left-wing parties, to lowest for those 
sympathizing with right-wing parties. 
- Norms of behaviour: Individuals with more liberal views are more prone to ‘convert-
out’ and leave the religion they were raised in. Two questions in the ISSP relate to 
views about norms of behaviour: one is related to extra-marital sex relations [the exact 
question is: For a married person to have sexual relations with someone other than his/her 
husband or Wife; Always wrong (value=1) to Not wrong at all (value=4)] and the other to 
homosexual unions [For two adults of the same sex to have sexual relations; identical values] 
Respondents were asked about their views on these two issues and were requested to 
choose among the following options: (1) always wrong; (2) almost always wrong; (3) 
wrong only sometimes; and (4) not wrong at all. Those who chose the third or fourth 
option were defined as having a liberal view on that issue. The basic idea is that more 
liberal individuals are more prone to convert-out and become nonreligious. 
Additionally, churches condemn extramarital and homosexual relations and therefore 
individuals who hold liberal views on these 'unmoral' issues felt 'rejected' by the church 
and had a higher tendency to disaffiliate. This gives ground to 
Proposition 13: Respondents with liberal views over extramarital sex relations and 
homosexual relations are more prone to convert-out.  
 - Beliefs in the basic religious doctrines: Four questions refer to beliefs in: life after 
death; heaven; hell; and miracles. The questions: “Do you believe in. after-
life/heaven/hell/miracles have four alternative answers: (1) yes, definitely; (2) yes, 
probably; (3) no, probably not; and (4) no, definitely not. Those who chose either option 
three or option four were defined as non-believers. Non-believers have a higher 
tendency to become secular. From an ‘economic’ perspective, non-believers do not 
expect any ‘benefits’ in the after-life, they do not foresee any returns to the ‘investment’ 
in church attendance and in other religious activities. As a result they do not intend to 
‘invest’ in religious activities and they become secular. This leads to    14
Proposition 14: Non-believers in after-life, heaven, hell and miracles have a higher 
tendency to disaffiliate
18.  
(c) Marriage effects: 
(c1) Marital status 
It is not clear what is the interrelationship between marital status and secularization. 
One can speculate that married individuals have a lower tendency to convert-out 
because a spouse is also involved in the process, thereby increasing the cost of the 
change by leading to quarrels and even divorce. It could also be that causation is 
running in the opposite direction: individuals who become secular have more 
difficulties in finding a partner, because the great majority does have a religion
19. 
Therefore, individuals who want a married life will also be less likely to convert-out. 
We can therefore speculate that  
Proposition 15: Married individuals have a lower tendency to convert-out 
compared to single, divorced or widowed individuals. 
(c2) The spouse's religious affiliation (for married respondents) 
- Spouse has the same denomination as the respondent was raised in. As people grow 
older, partners may become more important than parents or peer groups. Many people 
like to discuss religious matters and share their thoughts and ideas with their partners. A 
person will be more integrated in a religious community if his partner shares his 
religion. The parties at heterogamous unions are therefore at a high-risk of disaffiliation. 
People who intermarry are most probably less religious to begin with, and an inter-faith 
marriage can be a further factor in pushing people over the line into the ‘no religion’ 
category.  
Empirical studies support the relationship between inter-faith marriage and 
secularization. For example, Voas (2003) claims that identifying mixed marriages as the 
primary impetus of disaffiliation helps explain the “Swedish paradox”: high rates of 
church membership coexisting with very low attendance rates: Because the Church of 
                                                 
18 The testing of this proposition, by the inclusion of dummy variables for non-belief in each of the four 
doctrines could result in a simultaneity problem – it is not clear what is the direction of causation: Did the 
respondent leave religion as a result of non-believing or he first converted out and as a result he lost his 
beliefs. Could also be that the two processes happened simultaneously. To avoid simultaneity biases we 
also used a version that excluded these four belief variables.  
19 We don't know when the conversion-out took place – was it before getting married or after.   15
Sweden is very dominant, nearly all marriages are religiously homogamous. As a result, 
identification with the church and willingness to remain affiliated persist even in a 
highly secular culture. Voas (2003) concludes: “In the modern European family, 
religion needs a monopoly to survive” (page 97). The emphasis is on the European 
family because in the USA, heterogamous marriage does not seem to result in the loss 
of religious affiliation: Lehrer (1998) claimed that along with the increase in inter-faith 
marriages, over the course of the 20
th century, it has also become more acceptable for 
spouses to maintain different affiliations even after marriage; thus, intermarriage did not 
erode religious affiliations. Voas (2003) suggested that the different patterns in the US 
and Europe stem from different cultural responses to religious differentiation –diversity 
of faith and religious practice are core elements of the American ideology. The above 
arguments lead to the following 
Proposition 16: Respondents who are married to a spouse from a different 
denomination are at a higher risk of secularization (mainly in Europe). 
- Spouse has 'no religion': Being married to a spouse that is not affiliated with any 
religion, further increases the risk of secularization. Thus it is proposed that 
Proposition 17: The risk of secularization is further increased if the spouse has 'no 
religion'. 
 
3   Findings 
3.1  Descriptive statistics: Sample characteristics 
Before proceeding to report the results of the hypotheses testing, the characteristics of 
the samples used for the regression analysis are described. Table 1 presents means of 
the variables used for the econometric analysis. They are presented for the female and 
male samples and a distinction is also made between the larger sample and the sub-
sample, which includes only respondents from the more homogenous European 
countries.  
The means are similar for the general sample and the European sub-sample.Gender 
differences are also small. Approximately 12% of the women and 16% of the men 
converted-out: they were raised within a religion and currently claim to have 'no 
religion'. The figures are very similar also within the European countries. The somewhat 
lower percentage of women who converted-out is in line with theories and findings of 
other studies showing that women are generally more religious (Roof, 1989;   16
Sandomirsky and Wilson, 1990; Sherkat, 1991; Loveland, 2003; Branas-Garza and 
Neuman, 2004).  
Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
 
 All  countries  Europe 
  Female  Male Female Male 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE           
Convert-out  (%)  11.17  15.75 11.60 16.71 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES        
COUNTRY VARIABLES        
Pluralism index (range of 0-1)  0.21 (0.22)  0.22 (0.23)  0.17 (0.19)  0.17 (0.19) 
State-religion  (%)  33.94  32.15 37.57 36.05 
State-regulation of religion (%)  25.84  28.10  28.61  31.51 
Country church attendance (levels 1-6)   3.79 (0.91)  3.88 (0.86)  3.82 (0.94)  3.91 (0.90) 
Country prayer (levels 1-11)  5.74 (1.49)  5.63 (1.48)  5.57 (1.43)  5.47 (1.43) 
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES        
Religious denomination  
(raised in)                                      Catholic(%)  58.74  57.03 60.28 57.80 
Jewish (%)  0.04  0.32  0.00  0.09 
Muslim (%)  0.26  0.44  0.14  0.31 
Protestant  (%)  31.00  31.36 28.89 29.99 
Orthodox (%)  8.18  9.02  9.01  10.07 
Other Christian (%)  0.43  0.87  0.43  0.89 
Other religions (%)  1.34  0.95  1.25  0.85 
        
Religiously homogamous household (%)  93.94  94.32  94.87  94.88 
Intensive church attendance at 12 (%)  59.00  52.11  56.83  50.04 
Older than 60 years (%)  22.68  28.10  23.53  28.92 
Academic education (full or partial) (%)  23.33  24.80  21.32  22.64 
Residence in rural areas (%)  34.76  32.15  35.36  33.56 
        
Party affiliation                                   Left (%)  39.91  35.97  40.78  37.92 
Center  (%)  34.42  32.63 34.16 30.70 
Right  (%)  25.67  31.40 25.06 31.37 
        
“Extramarital sex relations” - liberal view (%)  13.42  18.56  14.37  19.92 
“Homosexual relations” - liberal view (%)  45.50  37.32  46.48  37.97 
        
“Does not believe in”        Life after death (%)  31.39  46.90  33.06  49.51 
Heaven  (%)  37.19  49.32 39.77 52.72 
Hell  (%)  54.16  60.77 56.92 63.77 
Miracles  (%)  39.00  49.44 40.92 51.78 
MARRIAGE ATTRIBUTES        
Marital status                                   Single (%)  6.71  6.76  7.28  7.49 
Married  (%)  85.06  89.11 83.71 88.24 
Separated/Divorced (%)  2.99  2.27  3.31  2.27 
Widowed (%)  5.24  1.87  5.70  2.01 
        
Spouse has same religion (%)  83.42  85.69  84.67  86.23 
Spouse has 'no religion' (%)  10.26  8.90  10.21  9.18 
        
Sample Size  2516  2310 2087 2244 
Standard deviations in parentheses 
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Interestingly, Shy (2007) who processed data from the World Christian Encyclopedia 
and calculated the percentage of secular people (nonreligious and atheists combined) in 
Europe, in the year 2000 arrived at a similar percentage of 17.8 (Table 1, page 1130).  
The countries are not very diverse in terms of existing religions: A pluralism index of 
0.21 (0.17 in Europe) indicates limited diversity. About 98% of respondents were raised 
in Christian denominations: About 58% of respondents were raised as Catholics, around 
30% grew up as Protestants, and 9% Orthodox. About 0.35% were Moslem (0.23% in 
European countries) and a mere 0.17% were Jewish (0.05% in Europe). Around one 
third of the countries have a state-religion and around 28% have state-regulation. 
An examination of the average levels of religious practice shows that despite rapid 
secularization the populations are still adhering to both mass services and prayer habits. 
The mass attendance average is above 3.5, on a scale of 1-to-6. The average prayer level 
is above 5.5, on a scale of 1-to-11. Interestingly, while women have a higher measure of 
the private/intimate activity of prayer, they exhibit a lower average of mass attendance, 
probably because the latter has networking motives that are more prevalent among men 
and also because in many places women are supposed to stay home and take care of the 
young children. Women seem to be more religious also in terms of belief in the 
religious doctrines of life after death, heaven, hell and miracles. However, a 
considerable percentage of the two genders do not believe in these doctrines: about 60% 
(56% of women and 62% of men) do not believe in hell. Close to 40% of women and 
over 50% of men do not believe in each of the three other doctrines. One can observe a 
kind of wishful believing: The percentage of non-believers in hell (stick) is much larger 
compared to non-believers in the three 'positive' (carrot) doctrines. 
An examination of childhood religious background shows that close to 95% of the 
participants grew up in households where the two parents belonged to the same 
denomination. Over 50% of respondents were exposed to intensive religious practice 
when they were aged 12 and attended church services on a regular basis (at least once a 
week).  
Focusing on the individuals currently married we observe that over 80% have a spouse 
with the same religious denomination the respondent was raised in, and around 10% 
have a spouse that declares having 'no religion'. 
The socio-demographic characteristics of our sample are as follows: About a quarter of 
the sample is above the age of 60. Close to 25% have an academic education (at least 
partial) and about a third reside in rural areas.   18
Married is still the most common marital status: About 85% of respondents are married, 
7% are single and the rest are widowed, divorced or separated.  
Regarding political affiliation, the largest group of respondents are affiliated with left-
wing parties (around 40%), over 30% belong to the political center, and about 25% are 
at the right-wing of the political spectrum. Over 40% have liberal views regarding 
homosexual relations, but only about 15% think that extramarital sex relations are 
acceptable. Interestingly, women are more liberal when it comes to homosexual 
relations and have a less liberal attitude towards extramarital sex relations. 
 
3.2  Regression results: Propositions testing 
Table 2 below presents Logit 'Converting-Out' regressions for women and men. 
Separate regressions were also run for the European countries sub-sample. The 
dependent variable was a dichotomous variable that equals one if the respondent was 
raised in a religión and currently has 'no religion' and 0 otherwise. The independent 
variables were those variables described in the previous section.  
The religious denomination the respondent was raised in was also included as a control 
variable: Individuals raised in the Orthodox denomination have the lowest tendency to 
convert-out (odds ratio of 0.10 compared to Catholics, the reference group). Subjects 
raised as Protestants also have lower prospects of secularization, while all other 
religious denominations are not significantly different from Catholics. 
Exhibit 1 summarizes (in page 20) the relevant regression results and the conclusions of 
the propositions outlined above.  
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Table 2. Logit Regressions 
 
   ALL  COUNTRIES  EUROPE 
   Female  Male  Female  Male 
COUNTRY SPECIFIC VARIABLES 
a) Religious strictness       
  Pluralism index 5.73 (0.002) 1.15 (0.752) 13.68 (0.000)  4.74 (0.003)
  State-religion 0.29 (0.000) 0.32 (0.000) 0.34 (0.001)  0.42 (0.001)
  State-regulation 1.04  (0.881) 0.67 (0.042) 0.95 (0.820)  0.66 (0.038)
b)Religious adherence        
  Country aver. mass 1.01 (0.958) 1.23 (0.073) 0.97 (0.864)  1.07 (0.584)
  Country aver. pray 0.74 (0.000) 0.85 (0.003) 0.81 (0.006)  0.85 (0.009)
PERSONAL ATTRIBUTES 
a) Religious         
    Denomination                   Catholic  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref. 
  Muslim 5.93 (0.069) 0.34 (0.384) 2.47 (0.512)  0.50 (0.599)
  Protestant 0.60 (0.040) 0.33 (0.000) 0.62 (0.088)  0.30 (0.000)
  Orthodox 0.12 (0.047) 0.09 (0.000) 0.11 (0.038)  0.10 (0.000)
  Other Christian 0.62 (0.741) 1.25 (0.730) 0.71 (0.812)  0.90 (0.883)
  Other Religions 1.57 (0.447) 0.78 (0.712) 0.99 (0.994)  0.36 (0.190)
     
Religiously homogamous household 0.42 (0.001) 0.65 (0.095) 0.37 (0.001)  0.55 (0.032)
Intensive church attendance at 12 1.02 (0.909) 0.71 (0.049) 0.91 (0.680)  0.64 (0.019)
b)Socio-demographic attributes               
Age (>60) 0.72 (0.251) 0.83 (0.325) 0.78 (0.388)  0.76 (0.162)
Academic education (full or partial)  1.57 (0.022) 0.93 (0.687) 1.84 (0.004)  1.17 (0.401)
Household income (4th. quarter) 1.55 (0.020) 1.19 (0.269) 1.45 (0.060)  1.13 (0.469)
Residence in rural areas 0.84 (0.390) 0.59 (0.002) 0.86 (0.491)  0.55 (0.001)
c)Beliefs         
   Party affiliation                        Left  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
  Center 0.44 (0.000) 0.63 (0.010) 0.41 (0.000)  0.74 (0.106)
  Right 0.37 (0.000) 0.58 (0.003) 0.37 (0.000)  0.57 (0.004)
      
Liberal view over extramarital sex 1.96 (0.003) 1.33 (0.094) 1.90 (0.006)  1.33 (0.104)
Liberal view over homosexual 
relations
1.60 (0.029) 1.36 (0.060) 1.50 (0.071)  1.35 (0.083)
Does not believe in life after death 1.73 (0.014) 1.38 (0.112) 2.02 (0.004)  1.40 (0.118)
Does not believe in Heaven 1.83 (0.039) 2.51 (0.002) 1.60 (0.130)  2.72 (0.002)
Does not believe in Hell 1.11 (0.752) 1.21 (0.551) 0.88 (0.709)  1.32 (0.442)
Does not believe in Miracles 1.60 (0.037) 2.54 (0.000) 1.65 (0.037)  2.38 (0.000)
MARRIAGE EFFECTS 
  Marital Status                        Single  Ref.  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
  Married 0.60 (0.080) 0.52 (0.012) 0.62 (0.125)  0.62 (0.079)
  Separated/Divorced 0.46 (0.186) 0.42 (0.171) 0.39 (0.108)  0.44 (0.230)
  Widowed 0.51 (0.159) 1.01 (0.981) 0.53 (0.183)  1.49 (0.378)
     
Spouse same religion as respondent 
raised in
0.39 (0.001) 0.21 (0.000) 0.33 (0.000)  0.25 (0.000)
Spouse has no religion 4.68 (0.000) 3.11 (0.000) 4.08 (0.000)  3.31 (0.000)
  SAMPLE  SIZE 2310  2516 2087 2244 
  R
2-Nagelkerke 0.839  0.772 0.837 0.768 
p-values in parentheses 
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Exhibit 1: Tests of Propositions – Summary of Regression Results 
 
Proposition: relationship 
between secularization and…  Regression Results  Conclusions 
1 Country Pluralism Index (PI):     
    ambiguous 
Positive effect: higher for females and 
higher in Europe. Odds ratios of 13.7 
and 5.7 for women in Europe and in 'all 
countries' (respectively), and respective 




2 State-religion: ambiguous;    
    reverse effect of PI 
Negative significant effect, similar in 
all regressions. Odds ratio of about 0.3 
Indirect evidence for a  
'subsidies effect'  
3 State-regulation: ambiguous;  
    reverse effect of PI  
Negative effect, significant for men 
only. Odds ratios of  0.7, similar in 'all 
countries' and in Europe 
Evidence  for 'subsidies 
effect' that might be 
more relevant for men 
4 Country average level of mass- 
    attendance: negative 




5 Country average level of prayer:  
    negative 
Negative significant effect: odds ratio 
around 0.8 
Proposition accepted 
6 Both parents had the same  
    religion: negative  
Significant negative effects, more 
pronounced for women (odds ratios of 
0.4 for women and 0.6 for men) 
Proposition accepted 
7 Intensive mass attendance at the  
    age of 12: negative  
Negative effects (around 0.7) for men 
only 
Proposition accepted 
for men only 




9 Academic education: positive  Significant positive effects for women 
only, sronger in Europe: odds ratios of 
1.6 and 1.8 
Proposition accepted 
for women only 
10 High income (4th quarter):  
     positive 
Significant positive effects for women 
only, around 1.5 in both regressions 
Proposition accepted 
for women only 
11 Residence in rural areas:  
      negative  
Significant negative effects for men 
only, around 0.6 in both regressions 
Proposition accepted 
for men only 
12 Political affiliation: stronger  
      negative effect for affiliation  
      with more right-wing parties 
Lower tendency for secularization as 
we move to the right; stronger negative 
effects for women; similar for Europe 
and 'all countries' 
Proposition accepted 
13 Liberal views over extramarital  
      sex relations and homosexual  
      relations: positive 
Higher tendecy for secularization 
among liberal individuals: stronger 
positive effects for women 
Proposition accepted 
14 Non-believing in afterlife/  
      heaven/hell/miracles: positive 
Non-significant effect for non-belief in 
hell. Basically positive effects for other 
religious doctrines 
Proposition accepted 
for 3 of the doctrines 
15 Marital status: married subjects  
      have a lower tendency  to  
      convert  
Significant negative effect (at 0.05, 




16 Spouse with same religion as  
      respondent was raised in:   
      negative 
Significant (at 0.01) negative effects, 
stronger for men  (odds of about 0.2 
and 0.3, for men and women, 
respectively)  
Proposition accepted 
17 Spouse has 'no religion':  
      positive 
Significant (at 0.01) positive effects, 
stronger for women: odds of about 4 
and 3, for women and men, 
respectively 
Proposition accepted   21
 
3.3  Discussion 
An examination of regression results (Table 2) and the summary of the main findings 
(Exhibit 1) leads to the following conclusions: 
Our data advocates that there is a clear strong correlation between the religious 
strictness of a country and the tendency of its population to convert-out and abandon 
any religious affiliation:  More religiously monopolistic countries have much lower 
rates of secularization. This is evidenced by the positive effect of religious pluralism 
and the negative effect of having a state-religion on secularization. 
Having state-regulation is also evidenced as having a negative effect on secularization, 
but much weaker than the effect of a state-religion and only on males
20. The effect of 
religious pluralism is much more pronounced in the European countries sub-sample and 
for women, indicating differences between European countries and non-continental 
countries, as well as gender differences. We can therefore conclude that our findings do 
not support supply-side theories. Quite the contrary, we find clear evidence in favour of 
the demand-side, Sociological approaches: A greater diversity does not stimulate greater 
religious participation but rather secularization. 
However, the stronger effects for Europe and the lack of significance for males in the 
general sample also indicate that there are differences between European and non-
European countries. Thus, demand-side theories could be useful to explore religious 
trends in Europe but less so for the rest of the world. This is compatible with the 
mentioned US case, which has both the highest levels of religious pluralism and one of 
the highest rates of church attendance (e.g. Warner, 1993). 
Exposure to more intensive religious practice, currently, and more importantly, during 
childhood,  leads to a lower tendency to convert-out and move to the 'no religion' 
sector: Respondents who grew up with parents who shared the same religious 
denomination are less prone to convert-out (odds ratios of about 0.4 for women and 0.6 
for men); experiencing intensive church attendance at the age of 12 further reduces the 
probability of men (but not women) to convert-out (odds ratio of about 0.7); and living 
                                                 
20 Probably because they are the main beneficiaries of the religious subsidies.  It follows that the 
government affects and manipulates the 'converting-out' process.   22
in a country with higher national averages of prayer levels also has a negative effect on 
secularization. The national average of mass attendance does not affect secularization
21. 
The literature reports mixed evidence regarding the effect of exposure to religiosity on 
secularization. The notion that childhood socialization factors can predict religion 
switching is still open to debate. Loveland (2003), who used the 1988 General Social 
Survey (GSS), found that joining a church while growing up acted to stabilize religious 
preferences, but greater levels of childhood religious socialization (measured by 
attendance of a religious school; Sunday School attendance; and saying grace before 
meals) were not significant deterrents of religious switching (page 152). Sherkat (1991) 
reached similar conclusions regarding the attendance of Sunday Schools and other 
formal child religious training – they did not reduce the likelihood of religious 
switching. Bibby (2000) presented data supporting the positive effect of a 
heterogeneous household on secularization: the Canadian Census data for 1991, showed 
(for example) that while only six percent of children to parents who were both Christian 
had no religious affiliation, the share rose to 31% if the children were raised by parents 
with mixed Catholic-Jewish affiliations.  
Personal socio-economic endowments have a minor effect on secularization. The 
insignificance of many of the coefficients could stem from the misspecification of these 
variables: the more relevant ones are the endowments at the time the individual decided 
to convert-out and not the current endowments. Current age and income
22 have basically 
insignificant effects. Education has a positive effect for women only
23 and living in 
rural areas has a negative effect for men only. 
Liberal ideology and beliefs are significantly correlated with the probability to convert-
out: Liberal beliefs are represented by affiliation with more secular (left-wing) parties; 
with liberal views over extramarital sex relations and homosexual relations; and with 
                                                 
21 These results seem to indicate that consumption motives (churches are places where people can 
socialize) and professional motives (churches serve as social networks) are not important to individuals 
who decide to convert-out.  
22 The effect of high income is significant (at 0.05) only for women in the larger sample). 
23 Roof (1989), based on GSS 1988, found that religion switchers tended to be male and well educated. A 
closely related topic is the relationship between education and religious attendance. It appears that it 
fluctuates highly among countries: In the United States, church attendance rises with education 
(Iannaccone, 1998). Sacerdote and Glaeser (2001), who examined 69 countries using the General Social 
Survey (GSS) 1972-1998, reported that in England and France they found a positive relationship. In most 
countries there was no significant relationship between education and religious attendance, while in the 
former socialist countries the connection was generally strongly negative. Te Grotenhuis and Sceepers 
(2001) and Branas-Garza and Neuman (2004) arrived at insignificant coefficients of schooling in mass 
participation equations for the Netherlands and Spain, respectively.    23
non-belief in the religious doctrines of afterlife/heaven/hell/miracles. Most of the effects 
seem to be stronger for women
24. Results are similar for both genders when only 
European countries are considered. 
There are marriage effects, related to the spouse's religious affiliation
25: Individuals 
who belong to homogamous unions have much lower odds of conversion-out (odds 
ratios around 0.2-0.3), while those married to a spouse with 'no religion' have much 
higher odds of conversion-out (odd ratios for over 4 for women and over 3 for men)
26. 
These results are in line with findings reported in studies on similar topics: Te 
Grotenhuis and Scheepers (2001) who used an event history analysis (based on 
retrospective data containing information on events that took place in the lives of the 
respondents since adolescence) found that in The Netherlands the most significant 
factor in an attempt to explain disaffiliation is having a partner who does not belong to a 
religious group. Respondents whose partners were non-members of the church were 12 
times more likely to become non-members themselves compared to respondents with a 
religiously affiliated partner. Voas (2003) found that in Britain, religious affiliation 
tends to be lost following marriage to someone from a different religion. 
  
4   Concluding Remarks 
Using ISSP-1998 data, this paper explored the determinants of disaffiliation, that is, 
determinants of individuals who were raised in a particular religion and currently define 
their religious affiliation as ‘no religion’. Our Logit regressions used a large array of 
explanatory variables: country specific variables, personal attributes and marriage 
characteristics. It was found that the tendency of individuals to leave their religion is: 
i)  strongly correlated with the religious strictness of their country 
ii)  strongly correlated with the spouse's religious characteristics  




                                                 
24 Some of the coefficients are insignificant for men. 
25 Being married also reduces the prospects of secularization but only for men in the larger sample. 
26 What we find is a positive relationship between disaffiliation of the respondent and the affiliation of 
her/his spouse that is 'no religion'. We do not have information on the date of disaffiliation of the 
respondent (and his spouse if the spouse is also with 'no religion'), whether it was before or after 
marriage. It is therefore not possible to distinguish between cause and effect: Perhaps the subjects 
converted-out when single, and then, naturally, married someone with a 'no religion' affiliation.  
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